Abstract
An other-directed moral judgement is contrasted with a moral evaluation of one's own behaviour; it is argued that having a capacity to make self-directed moral judgements is at the core of being within morality, while a lack of disposition on the part of a mature individual to judge others is indicative of the corresponding lack with regard to the self-directed evaluations. Our readiness to evaluate the behaviour of others measures the level of our commitment to a system of morality. Consistent nonjudgementalism subverts the interpersonal nature of moral values and points to a deeper issue – an unwillingness of a nonjudgementalist to apply moral categories to her own choices.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 396-413 |
| Number of pages | 18 |
| Journal | Philosophical Investigations |
| Volume | 40 |
| Issue number | 4 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Oct 2017 |
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