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On The Virtue of Judging Others

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2 Scopus citations

Abstract

An other-directed moral judgement is contrasted with a moral evaluation of one's own behaviour; it is argued that having a capacity to make self-directed moral judgements is at the core of being within morality, while a lack of disposition on the part of a mature individual to judge others is indicative of the corresponding lack with regard to the self-directed evaluations. Our readiness to evaluate the behaviour of others measures the level of our commitment to a system of morality. Consistent nonjudgementalism subverts the interpersonal nature of moral values and points to a deeper issue – an unwillingness of a nonjudgementalist to apply moral categories to her own choices.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)396-413
Number of pages18
JournalPhilosophical Investigations
Volume40
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - Oct 2017

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